The Ninth Court of Appeals sits in Beaumont and covers Hardin, Jasper, Jefferson, Liberty, Montgomery, Newton, Orange, Polk, San Jacinto, and Tyler counties.
After a court of appeals decision, either party can file a Petition for Discretionary Review (PDR) asking the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to reconsider the outcome. The CCA grants about 6.5% of PDRs from Ninth Court decisions—but when it takes a case, rules against the lower court in only about half of them, meaning it agrees with the Ninth Court more often than with most Texas courts of appeals. Montgomery County, one of the fastest-growing counties in Texas, anchors the northern end of this district.
This Court hears appeals from pretrial habeas denials (articles 11.08 and 11.09) and from 11.072 rulings (community supervision). Habeas under article 11.07—the main felony route—is filed with the convicting court and decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Direct Appeals and Postconviction Relief for the full map.
Ninth Court of Appeals—Cases
- Leax v. State, Nos. 09-14-00452-CR & 09-14-00453-CR (direct appeal). Two counts of online solicitation of a minor under section 33.021(c) of the Texas Penal Code following a plea that preserved a motion to quash. We argued that the subsection is facially overbroad under the First Amendment, void for vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment, and a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
- Ex parte Fusselman, Nos. 09-21-00129-CR through 09-21-00138-CR (pretrial habeas). Ten indictments for possession of child pornography under section 43.26 of the Texas Penal Code. We argued that the statute is facially overbroad because it reaches seventeen-year-olds who have reached the age of consent, criminalizes images of body parts the Supreme Court has not categorized as child pornography, and reaches simulated rather than real sexual conduct.
- Ex parte Shroff, Nos. 09-17-00082-CR & 09-18-00066-CR (habeas under article 11.072). A deferred-adjudication conviction for online solicitation of a minor under section 33.021(c). We argued that the statute was unconstitutional and the plea involuntary, and, after remand, that because it was unclear whether the conviction rested on the overbroad reading later narrowed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, our client was entitled to a new trial.
- Ex parte Boyd, Nos. 09-17-00366-CR & 09-17-00367-CR (pretrial habeas). Two indictments for online impersonation under section 33.07(a) of the Texas Penal Code. We argued that the statute is a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny, overbroad because its sweep reaches satire, criticism, news, and political speech, and vague because it fails to specify what kind of harm must be intended.
- Ex parte Lopez, No. 09-17-00393-CR (pretrial habeas). A charge of unlawful disclosure of intimate visual material (“revenge pornography”) under section 21.16 of the Texas Penal Code. We argued that the statute is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech, is not narrowly drawn, and is void for vagueness because “disclose” is undefined.
- Ex parte Mahmoud, No. 09-15-00424-CR (pretrial habeas). An online-solicitation-of-a-minor charge under section 33.021(c) of the Texas Penal Code. We argued that the statute is overbroad under the First Amendment, vague under the Fourteenth Amendment, and a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
- Ex parte Eribarne, No. 09-17-00036-CR (pretrial habeas). A charge of retaliation by threatening a public servant under section 36.06 of the Texas Penal Code. We argued that the statute is facially overbroad and vague under the First Amendment because it restricts speech by content, reaches protected speech beyond true threats, and cannot survive strict scrutiny.